The philosophical debate on the legitimization of war has al ongh istory.With few exceptions, however,t he center of attention has usually been placed on what legitimizes wars (jus ad bellum)a nd how they mayb el ed (jus in bello). Most theoreticians have not discussed the dimension of the jus post bellum: that wars, just likee very other human action, not onlyh aveabeginning and are carried out but also have an end and an aftermathand involveresponsibility for the consequences of the events. What happens after the war,whether (and which of)the protagonists are liable for the political, institutional and economic reconstruction of the country,whether they carry aresponsibility towardthe collapsed society,t he wounded, thoset hat werel eft behind or the refugees,t hese ethicallye ssentialq uestions are usually not taken into consideration. This mayb ee xplainedb yt he fact that the problems mentioned, once the war is over,obligate politics and not the conduct of war (and thus no longer the theory of alegitimate war). That such an explanation is whollyinappropriate is not only confirmed by the pragmatic fact thatpoorlyheld peace negotiations, unfair treaties and unresolvedconflicts mayfuel new violent conflicts.Itissimplystunning that the consequences of individual and collective actions are considered from ethical as well as legal perspectivesa si ntrinsic components of theirl egitimization but thatt he devastating effects of the war are hardlyt aken into account in the analysis of the war'sj ustness and resulting responsibilities.
Do thosew ho willfullys tart aw ar have ar esponsibility towardr efugees in the form of an obligation that is not alreadyc overed by international refugee law?¹ Shouldthe answer be positive,the question then arises whether the initiators of the war are also responsible if the war represents a "just" intervention against ar egime that itself has causeds treams of refugees due to massive human rights abuses.Underlying this line of thought is the more general question whether the ethics of peace -the reflection on the conditions of its just establishment and the responsibilities for its realization -should be understood as part of the jus post bellum doctrine. The very sketchiness of the doctrine and especially its dependence on other parts of the doctrine of the just war invite skepticism.A fter the war,o ne might argue, everythings hould be done to pacify a conflict permanently. Pragmatism and efficiency,n ot retributive considerations are then called for.B laming ac ertain sidef or the war does not leada nywhere. Wars are abusiness in which all involved inevitably gettheir hands dirty.Afinal line should be drawna nd the focus should be on the future.
Those who think this wayconsider the obligation to help in the reconstruction effort as aduty of humanity.Accordingly, the doctrine of just war would lose its applicability with the war'send. A jus post bellum would thus be superfluous (Lazar2 012).
This article concentrates on these questions and the desideratumo ft he literature on the justwar.Iwill distinguish between aminimaland maximal interpretation of the jus post bellum. In addition, Iwill ask whether the jus post bellum should be conceivedi nalogical and ethical connection with the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello at all.
Iwill analyze the arguments thats peak for and against treating the dimension of flight from the consequences of war under the rubric of the jus post bellum. Iw ill not arguei nf avor of at oo close connection between the threee lements of the doctrine of the just war. Wars, such as defensive war or humanitarian intervention,a re not onlyu njust because the partiesi nvolvedd o not care about the post-war period. Anda nu njust war does not automatically mean afailureofthe jus post bellum. Moreover,the variety of the potential measures for maintaining peace becomes toolimited if one focuses solelyonthe attribution of guilt (Lazar 2012,p.204) . Not onlythe fighting partiesbut alsocountries that are financiallybetter off and have the required competencies should be involved in the reconstruction effort.There is al ot to be said, however,that jus post bellum should not be entirely substituted by an independent doctrine of  With respect to the protection of refugees, focus is especiallyonthe GenevaRefugeeConvention of 1951a nd its additional protocol on the legal status of refugees of 1967. peace. The serious consideration of establishing sustainable peace as well as the resulting costs should place highburdens on the decision to use military force. I also advocate the position thatpart of the responsibilities towardrefugees of war are due to the destruction that is inevitably caused by the war. In this sense, all partiesinvolved in the war carry aresponsibility insofar as they bring harm to a people (Pattison 2013; Carens 2013,p.195) .² "Warmatters not onlybecause of the terrible toll it takes on human livesand the environment,but because it is practicallythe onlysphere of human conduct in which we actively aim at such terrible ends -and believet hat it might be justified to do so" (Frowe/Lazar 2018, p. 2) . This speaksfor a jus post bellum. The obligation -Iwill make asuggestion at the end as to how it could be designed institutionally -should,however,not be understood as punishment but as af orm of compensation. Thus, the USAt ook in hundreds of thousands of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos after the Vietnam War -as ag esture of compensation. With reference to the problem of refugees of war,h owever,Iconsider it irrelevant who initiated the war or whether the war was just or unjust.
Iwould like to point out that Id on ot take up the debate as to whether nations have ag eneral obligation to takei nr efugees of war and how such an obligation is in agreement with the right to sovereignty.Ialso do not focus on a duty of humanityt oward others (bet hey next of kin or strangers). Id on ot denyit, on the contrary.However,m yconsiderations are limited here to aspects of the jus post bellum. The retributive argument does not replaceh umanitarian responsibility,t hough.The special responsibility of some nations does not provide others with ab lankc heckt on eglect their legal and humanitarian obligations. Ia ma ware of the fact that,a ss oon as Ia llow the relationship between the reasons for the flight and the responsibility toward refugees to become normatively relevant Io pen aP andora'sb ox:W ew ould have to ask ourselvesa ccordingly whyo nlyw ar but not all other causes for flight,w hich are also due to the harming of people and unjust global institutions such as global poverty or climate change, are takeni nto account.I ndeed, these aspects would have to be analyzeda sw ell. Iw ill intentionallyl eave them out here. Is olelyf ocus on the context of war,t hus on the jus post bellum. As mentioned, it is about a concrete responsibility and not about an obligation of mani ng eneral. Since  Joseph Carens mentions the causal connection of causingharm as apotential justification for havingt ot akei nr efugees.
The Jus PostB ellum and the Responsibility towardR efugeeso fW ar there is hardlyany literature on this question thataffects me, Iconsider this article as ad raft to stimulate ad ebate that is onlys lowlyb eginning.³
Jus PostB ellum
The jus post bellum regulates the transition from war to peace and the establishment of ap ost-war order.C onsiderations on aj ust peace are articulated along three axes: compensation for damages; retributive justice, namely, the punishment of warc rimes; establishment of institutionalc onditions of ap ermanent peace. Although therea re different opinionsi nt he literature on how aj ust post-war state should look like, how it is broughta bout and which demands are directed at whom, thereisbroad consensus about some key aspects: namely, that the victorious parties should reestablish the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the defeated enemy; that the victims of war crimes should be compensated; that the defeated nation and its civil society should be supported in the rebuildinge ffort and that war criminals should be put on trial (Fabre 2018) . Opinions vary significantlyw hen it comest oa scribing responsibilities.
Minimalists consider the jus ad bellum to be alegal instrument of prevention to limit the demands of the victorious partiesfrom the beginning.They distance themselvesf rom the theologicallyr ooted doctrine of the justw ar and base their position on the legal interpretation as it was provided especiallyi nt he 17 th and 18 th centuries by Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel (Bellamy2 008, p. 602) .⁴ According to them,those in power mayonlygotowar with the purpose of responding to unjust attacks (de Vattel [1758 (de Vattel [ ] 1959 .⁵ The jus post bellum was accordingly  One of the few exceptions is an article by James Souter,S outer( 2014) . Carens also mentions compensation as potential justification of as pecial obligation. However,h ed oes not follow up on this anyfurther: "The first rationale [tog enerate ad utyt oa dmit refugees] is causal connection. Sometimes we have an obligation to admit refugees because the actions of our own state have contributedinsome waytothe fact that the refugees are no longer safe in their home country" (Carens 2013,p .195) .  See Alex Bellamy "Drawing upon the quasi-judicial concept of the just war evident in the work of jurists such as Grotius and Vattel (…), minimalists tend to view just wars in terms of rights vindication and arguet hat combatants aree ntitled to wage war onlyt ot he point at which their rights arev indicated" (Bellamy2 008, p. 602).  Waristhe stateofpursuingthe lawthroughviolence, says Emer de Vattel ("Der Krieg ist der Zustand der Verfolgung desR echts durch die Gewalt",deV attel [1758] 1959, Chap.I /I). And nations have the right to makeuse of force onlytotheir defense and protection of their rights (Und das Recht zur Gewaltanwendung steht den Nationen "nur zu ihrerV erteidigung und zur Wahrung ihrer Rechtez u " ,d eV attel [1758] 1959, Chap.I II/III). limited to correctingt he wrongt hat had causedthe war.This includes the legal regulationofc ompensation and restitution of illegallyt aken goods. Laws hould prevent thatt he resulting vacuum of power would be abused by the victorious partiesf or their own good.
With regard to the question whether nations are onlya llowed to restoret he status quo ante,minimalists respond differently. Someconsider the removal of a government thath as been viewed as at hreat to international peace as ac onsequent and rightful continuation of the jus ad bellum (Orend 2012,p .4 5; Cohen 2006 -7, p. 498) .⁶ Strictlys peaking, however,r egime changed oes not belong to the legal measureso fc orrecting unlawful behavior; other authorst herefore criticize this position as inconsistent (Bellamy2 008, p. 606).O nt he other hand, the punishment of war criminals is considered to be an important measure in restoringt rust in the judicial institutions and the state. In the minimalist interpretation, it is moreover unclear how legal instruments are to functionifn either side has aj ust reason for the war.A nd if aw ar was unjust,the minimalist does not have the ability to hold the unjust victor responsible for taking jus post bellum measures.
Maximalists arguet hat victory does not onlyentail the obligation to moderate but also to take positive measures towards asustainable peace and the reestablishment of af unctioning constitutional state (Bellamy2 008). The return of stolen goods, compensation for goods that cannot be replaced, rebuilding,r econciliation, are, as alreadym entioned, measures that, in the view of maximalists, contributetoajust and sustainable peace and thereforebelong to the instruments of the jus post bellum. They exist largely independent of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the war (May2 012,p p. 19 -20) It is astonishingt hat neither the mainlyc orrective interpretation of the jus post bellum by the minimalistsn or the extended interpretation of the maximalists takes into account the dimension of displacement and flight as one aspect of the consequences of war and responsibility to rebuild.
One reason for this maybethe fact that refugees, insofarasthey are in exile, are mostlynot part of post-war negotiations. This reason is, however,hardlyconvincing.D isplacement and flight are not natural events. People leave their homes during the war because they lost everything in the devastation of the war,b ecause they are afraid of their liveso rb ecause they have been intentionallydisplaced by the government or awar party.Moreover,alarge proportion of  See Orend, whoconsiders the aim of ajust war as to ensure "amoresecurepossession of our rights,both individualand collective" (Orend 2012, p. 45) . Other critics go much further and view the normative standardo fi nterventionist nations to install morej ust governments as an extension of colonial thought (Cohen 2006 -7, p. 498) .
The Jus PostB ellum and the Responsibility towardR efugeeso fW ar refugees wish to return to their native country.E nablinga nd preparingt heir return is often one of the basic preconditions for reviving ab roken economya nd sustainable peace among asociety.⁷ Due to at least these two reasons the aspect of responsibilitytoward refugees belongs, in my view,tothe keyquestions of the ethics of aj ust peace -and accordingly, of the jus post bellum. Therefore, one mayw onder whyi th as been totallyn eglected in the debate.
2W ar Refugees and Their Protectiont hrough International Law
Before Idiscuss the arguments that speak for or against the reference to refugees in the jus post bellum,t wo concepts need to be clarified. First: When Ispeak of warrefugees, Idistance myself from aliteral interpretation of the Geneva RefugeeConvention, which defines refugees as persons that are being pursuedfor reasons of race, religion, nationality,affiliation with acertain social group or political convictions (Art.1GenevaR efugee Convention). This definition is basedonindividual situations and neglects war as astructural cause for flight.When Ispeak of refugees, fleeing persons or also displaced persons, Iconsider these three concepts not onlyasrepresenting one and the same, but Ia lsol imit myself in this context entirely to flight as ac onsequenceo fw ar.
Second, Iwill not deal with the problem of domestic displacement.N ot because Iconsider it less dramatic, quitethe contrary.Those that are forced to flee within theiro wn country are tragicallyt he "poor relatives" of international law (Orchard 2016,p.604) . While international refugees have aright to protection by the Geneva RefugeeC onvention of 1951a nd thus also receive support from the RefugeeA gency of the United Nations (UNHCR), it is expected thatdomestically displaced persons first of all receive support from their native country even though that is oftentimes the cause for their flight.T he mandate of the UNHCRu sually does not applyt ot his group which is even largert han that of international refugees.
My focus is solelyo ni nternational refugees because the principle of sovereignty often serves governments as apretense to limit access to theirt erritories. This illustrates the dilemma in which the EU findsi tself with respect to those members tates that close their borders to refugees. In the context of the jus  It should, however,not be forgotten that the massive return of refugees can lead to significant problems especiallyw hent heir flight was duet oc ivil wars,g enocide or widespread racism. I thank Rüdiger Bittner for pointingt his out. post bellum, obligation is being tied to the special responsibility for damagethat has been caused, thus responsibility becomesamatter of retributive duties.The duties towardr efugees would accordinglyf all under the obligations of compensation for damaget hat has been caused.
Another problem needs to be pointed out: Does the jus post bellum merely createm oral or alsol egal responsibilities?T he status of the jus post bellum remains unclear.F or some authors, it definitelyf alls into the realm of morality (Cryer 2012; Walzer 2004,pp. 162-168) . Forothers, it should also entail legal effects thatresultfrom legal norms of humanitarian international law, international human rights agreements or international criminall aw (Österdahl/van Zadel 2009,p.175) .⁸ In my view,both positions are valid. The jus post bellum is based on acorpus of international lawthatbinds the respective contracting states.The basic principles of the jus post bellum,however,are moral principles that have a regulatory function insofar as they provide information on how international law can be further developed by interpretation or new contracts (May2 012,p .4 ).⁹
3R esponsibilities toward Refugees as Part of the Jus PostB ellum?
Af irst argument against integrating ar esponsibility towardr efugees into the doctrine of the jus post bellum could be: We onlys peak of jus post bellum if the war is over.T he refugee problem is one thato ccurs during the war.A fter the war,i ti so nlyt emporary,a sl onga st he rebuildingo ft he nation has not gone far enough, as long as there is not am inimum of sufficient infrastructure and security. This argument is of af undamental nature. It is about clarifying when one can speak appropriately of a "post-war period",a si ti si nm anyc ases problematic to definitivelys ay when aw ar is reallyo ver. Manyc onflicts,p articularly those that fall under the typologyofthe so-called new wars, neither have aclearly definable beginning (the war is not "declared")n or ac learlyd efinable end. "Conventional wars"-such as the Gulf Wart hatw as declaredi n2 003 by then US President George W. Bush -also often have an open end: When his suc- Some authors see aq uasi-legals et of additional responsibilities in the mandateo fa id: The obligation of reconstruction, as declaredb yt he ICISS (Bellamy2 008, p. 616).  "In settingout agroup of jus post bellum principles Ia mm akingaplea for them to become instituted, but my arguments in favoro fh avingt hem become legaln orms should not be confused with thinkingt hat they alreadyh avel egal status,w hich they do not" (May2 012,p .4 ).
The Jus PostB ellum and the Responsibility towardR efugees of War cessor Barack Obama announced the withdrawal of troopsinA ugust 2010,more than 3,000 Americans oldiers had been called since Bush'sp roclaimed end of the war (May2 013,p .3 16).
The end of military conflict moreover does not necessarilyresolve the cause of flight.The reasons for flight are diverse. Ac ontinuous lack of securityo ra n ongoing threat for certain groups can be good reasons for granting protection.
The history of wars of the 20 th and 21 st centuries additionallyprovides examples for the fact thatelements of the doctrineofthe jus post bellum indeedhave unfoldede ffectiveness before the war'se nd. This especiallyh olds for prosecutions of war crimes. The most famous examples are the trials against US Lieutenant William L. Calley, responsible for the My-Lai massacre in the Vietnam War, or more recently, against thoser esponsible for the humiliatingabuse in the US-led Abu-Ghraib prison during the Iraq War(May2012,Chap. 4).¹⁰ "Efforts at rebuilding civil and political society can be made (…)e vena sh ostilities of insurgent warfare or concerted terrorism continue in ways that can plausiblybesaid to extend the original war" (Coady2 011, p. 50).
Hereo ne maya rgue that the realm of the jus post bellum has been left in favoro ft he jus in bello. It is the task of the judiciary duringt he war to assess whether the (Geneva) Conventions werea dhered to or not.
Regardless of whether the jus in bello is to be understood in close connection to other parts of the doctrine of the just war or not,itisinm yopinion appropriate and desirable to never ignoret he state after the war in considerations on whether awar or ahumanitarian intervention is legitimate and how they are carried out.A lreadyI mmanuelK ant statedawarning in his Perpetual Peace as a precondition to ap otential peace between governments: "No state at war with another shalla llow itself such acts of hostility as would have to make mutual trust impossible duringafuture peace" (Kant [1795] 1996,p.320). Thus, he points out that the ways in which awar is conducted, which type of crimes combatants commit or what kinds of weapons are used have asignificant effect on peace negotiations and the rebuilding effort after the war.One mayonlythink of the long lasting societal traumatization that results from the systematic practice of rape as an instrument of war (the humiliation of the opposition) as well as the long-term environmental damages from chemical or atom bombs. "(…)S tates should look not onlyt ot he short-term consequences of wartime warc rimes trials, but also to the longer-term issue of what the society will be like at the end of  In both cases, prosecutions werec arried out beforeU Sm ilitary courts.I ti s, however,n ot a requirement of retributive justice that war crimes aretried beforeaninternational tribunal (May 2013,Chap.4). war if thatwar has been conducted in away thatinvolveswar crimes. This raises Jusp ost bellum issues( … ) "(May2 012,p .7 3).
If one took the perspective of the jus post bellum seriously, then governments would have to assess, from the perspective of how thingsw ould look like after the war,whether it is worth to conduct the war in the first place. "[S]ome serious planning must go into the post-war phase right from the start. Winners, like the United States over Iraq in 2003,should never find themselvesinaposition where they have won the war but they do not know what to do now,a nd so start making up post-war policy on the fly" (Orend 2008, p. 40) . This, however,d oes not mean thatw ars that are indeedl egitimate automaticallyb ecome delegitimized if no one has an idea of what should happen after the war.
There is another pressingq uestion: Should all parties that have initiated a war be held responsible for the admission or financingo fr efugees (I will turn to this alternative briefly)? Even if aw ar wasb egun for humanitarian reasons? As ar eminder: Ia rgued in favoro ft he special responsibility towardr efugees due to the harm caused and Iamtherefore inclined to answer positively.Acounter argument would be: The retributive response is first of all conceptualized in a wrongw ay,i ti ss econdlyu nfair and bears unintended consequences.
Regarding the first point: The responseiswrongly conceptualized because it accuses the wrongside. Not those that carry out ahumanitarian intervention violate negative rights, but those in power that caused the intervention by allowing or even organizingt he violation of human rights.
This argument holds true. Apolice operation in response to abank robbery, the allowed high speed of an ambulance or af ire truck etc. entail risks that we have to takeinorder for rapid help to be available. Help in reaction to an emergency or damageshould thereforenot be conceptualizedasdamage, not even if it resultsin"collateral damage" as long as it is not the means to realize the end but rather aside effect and is proportionate. However,evenifthe act,the goal of which is to rescue or aid cannot be considered as damaging -in spite of the fact that innocent people maybeharmed by it -this does not mean thatthe victims have no claim to compensation. Violence in cases of self-defensea nd helping someone should onlyb ed irected at the attacker.I ti sn ot allowed to impact the legal interests of third parties as long as there is no state of emergency.I f someone uninvolved is harmed by ap olice operation, he or she has the right to receive compensation (Lazar 2012,p .2 08; Tracy 2007,p p. 16 -19) .
The second argument claims that the retributive perspective entails unjust consequences: "[C]onsistentlyp ursued, rectificatory post-war policies would lead to cripplingb urdens on both just and unjust belligerents" (Lazar2 012, p. 207). Anxiety towards uch "cripplingb urdens" is appropriatee speciallyi f one considers the other responsibilities thatg oh and in hand with maximalist theory of the jus post bellum. The rebuildingofadestroyed nation and its institutionsr esults in gigantic costs.I fo ne weret oc onsequentlye xtend the retributive logic to these areas,the burdens would indeed be crippling and would also affect the wrongpeople: citizens of acountry would be collectively held accountable, regardless of whether the war wasl egitimate or not.I fi tw as legitimate, they would illegitimatelyb ep unished for the costs of aj ust action. If the war was illegitimate, the citizens would be doubly punished: for an unjust regime and for the consequences of the warl ed or caused by that regime.
Id on ot denyt hat both arguments have ap oint but would like to highlight three further aspects.
The first refers to the function of the three parts of the doctrine of the just war.T he legitimacyo fahumanitarian intervention depends both on reasons for going to war and on the wayw ar is led. The literature acknowledgest hat a military intervention is justified onlyi nr eaction to massive human rights violations, i. e., massacres,f orced relocation or displacement of as ignificant part of the population, "ethnic cleansing" or persecution of minorities. The paradox of such an intervention -namely, harming innocent people in the name of defending human rights -is supposedtobeless acute duetothe fact that attacks are prohibited if they mayb e" expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damaget oc ivilian objects, or ac ombination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated".¹¹ If the intervention is launched without ac lear pathwayt os uccess and if it can onlybes uccessful by aerial bombardment thatt hreatens non-military targets, it is prohibited.
Starting awar is undoubtedlyone of the riskiest endeavors of all. Therefore, there should be highs tandards regardingt he calculation of costs and benefits, and the party leading the war should be held accountable for consequences it did not aim for but the risk of which it could have anticipated (Stoecker 2004, p. 171) .
However,these boundaries remain vagueand they are morallyquestionable to the extent thatthey legitimate the use of military force.¹² The principles of the jus post bellum provide an opportunity to sharpen these criteria. If one takes them seriously, thosewho start awar must participate in rebuilding the damaged country. "There are jus post bellum duties on both sides at the end of awar.Ifthe victorious party is the party that justlyi nitiated war,then it mayh aved uties to  Protocol Additionalt ot he GenevaC onventions of 12 August 1949, and relatingt ot he Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8J une 1977 Art.5 1 §5b.  Foranilluminatingdiscussion on the principles legitimizinghumanitarian intervention, see Merkel (2012). rebuild and reconcile, etc.; and the losing sidewhich was the aggressor alsoobviouslyh as dutiesa tthee nd of war" (May2012,p.16). Accordingly, no government would theoretically be allowed to enter military action which can be estimated to destroy the infrastructure of the opponent and either kill or displace numerous civilians. The responsibility toward refugees of war should also influence the wayt he war is conducted and provide as trongi ncentive to createa minimum of collateral damage. If an intervention is successful in achieving its goal, the number of refugees should moreover decrease and not increase.
The second aspect has to do with the logic of ah umanitarian intervention. As it is widelyk nown, such an intervention is supposed to protect people from the abuse of power of their own government.This justification rests on the liberal notion dating back to the earlym odern period which claims thats tates or governments are justified in exerting their monopolyofviolence to protect their citizens. In turn, this means thatastate thath as become an instrument of repression against its own citizens has lost its legitimacy.I nternally, it no longer deserves to be defended by its own people and has consequentlyf orfeited the normative basisofthe people'sobligation for defense. Externally, it loses its entitlement to recognition of its right to self-defense against otherc ountries.
This opinion has meanwhile even made its wayi nto international law. The concept of "Responsibility to Protect" (or "R2P"), which was particularlyshaped by the "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (ICISS)¹³ around the changeo ft he millennium, indeed emphasizes the double responsibility that the concept of sovereignty entails: aresponsibility directed toward the outside, namely,r espectingt he sovereignty of othern ations, and ar esponsibilityd irected towardt he inside, namely,p rotecting the fundamental rights of all citizensw ithin the territory.I fastate is not willing or not able to do so, it loses its right to be considered sovereign by the international community.Moreover,itshould then be left to the international community to take on a subsidiary responsibility towardt he people that are being threatened.
By admitting or financiallys upportingr efugees from the country in which the interventiontakes place, the intervening countries pursue their declared objectives: they offer protection.I ni ndividual cases, they even provide ar eplacement for the lost political status by granting refugees citizenship.¹⁴ This demonstrates,o ne might argue, at est of motivation: whys hould states that trulyc are about the protection of strangers, even at the cost of human loss among its own
 International Commission on Intervention and StateS overeignty (ICISS).
 On this see the article by James Souterwho strongly advocatesnaturalization of war refugees as ag estureo fc ompensation for aw ar: Souter( 2014) .
The Jus PostB ellum and the Responsibility towardR efugeeso fW ar people and enormous financial costs as aresult of the war,close their borders to refugees of war?Incomparison to the overall costs of the intervention (including the costs for its own internal political stability), acontribution to solving refugee crises is relativelysmall but can have long-term economic benefits(D'Albis/Boutane/Coulibaly2 018).
Finally, it should be pointed out thatinternational lawonlyallows interventions that have been authorized by the UN.Unilateral interventions are in violation of international law. Since the international community has the responsibility to protect,t his means that the very samec ommunity is liable for upholding the principles of the jus post bellum. Thus, the responsibilities would not be any different thanthey are now if the organization and costs of the refugeeprogram would be added to the other principles of the jus post bellum. The UNHCR has alreadyt aken over am ajor part of refugeea id worldwide.
Those who are skeptical with respect to the jus post bellum as alegal instrument of peace will raise further doubts. They will, for example, claim that wars createc haotic conflict situations in which several actors are involved. It is often unclear who started av iolent conflicto ri so therwise responsible. In addition, war crimes are oftenc ommitted by all parties involved.¹⁵ This skepticism is appropriate. Due to the just mentioned reasons,a mong others, Is uggested to make no differenceb etween the partiesi nvolvedi nt he war.The killing of civilians and the destruction of their livelihood is prot anto morallyc ondemnable. Refugees of war are victims of violence, be it conducted by an unjust regime, by freedom fighters or intervening troops.
Finally, these skeptics will arguet hat what matters after the war is to fight sufferingq uicklya nd efficiently. The wealthier countries should contribute. This position is de facto not in conflict with the one Ih avet aken. Saudi Arabia as arich nation should contribute amuch largeramount to the UNHCR than, for example, Yemen. The additional amountt hatS audi Arabia would need to pay due to the devastating consequences of its military intervention in Yemen, includingt he flight of civilians, could benefit the UNHCR.
This consideration bringsmetothe final aspect of the jus post bellum that I would liketomention, namely, its institutionalization. Iwill limit myself to pro- The question according to Seth Lazar is "whetherthe harms suffered in war should be treated under the corrective justicer ubric at all. Appeals to corrective justicem ight make sense in peacetime, when the harms areo fl imitedm agnitude and the liable party can -with the aid of ac areful judicial process -be ascertained. But in the aftermath of wars,when the suffering and wrongdoing ares ow idespread and general, af ocus on compensation should be at best a subordinateg oal to the overridingi mperativeso fr econstruction and peaceb uilding" (Lazar 2012,p .2 07). viding indications into which directions this aspect would need to be developed further.
4T he Institutional Dimension
One basic question still remains open: Whatk ind of responsibility towardr efugees is at issue? Should governments involved in war be made responsible to admit refugees of ad efeated country or of ac ountry in which they have intervened?T he generalization of this condition would have absurdc onsequences. It would seem absurd to forceahostile state to admitrefugees as well as to convince them to seek protection in that country.Who among the Syrianvictims of Russian bombsw ould wish to be taken in by Russia?I ts hould rather be left to the refugees in which country they would liket os eek asylum.
Currently, the UNHCRi sm ainlyb eing funded by voluntary contributions of governments, intergovernmental actors,f oundations and privatep ersons. It is, however,h ard to understand whya no rganization that serves an indispensable purpose for the international community depends so stronglyonthe good will of the states.A tthe latest since the ICISS document on the responsibilitytoprotect was recognizedatthe UN World Summit2005 by numerous states -even though not in form of ab indingd eclaration -the protection of civilians in armed conflicts can be considered an acknowledgedd uty of the international community.
Ideally,all states would have to payinto arefugeefund proportional to their gross nationalproduct as well as inverselyproportional to the number of admitted refugees. States that alreadyadmit alargernumber of refugees thanona veragew ould need to be relieved or freed with respect to their contribution. States that cause the flight of civilians due to violent politics of aw ar should be held accountable in as trongerw ay,e ither by taking in refugees of waro rb yp aying more. The calculation of the additional financial contribution should be done by an expert commission. The financial participation of privatep ersons and enterprises, which are especiallyi nvolvedi np rovidingw ar material, or of warlords, who cashinonthe war,should not be excluded from the beginning (Kyriakakis 2012,p .115; B ush 2009; P unch2 009) .
5C onclusion
In this article, Ip ointed out ag ap in the jus post bellum and peace research. Flight is an inevitable consequence of all wars. One war dead is matched by hundreds of displaced people. Still, and in spite of the fact that displaced people playasignificant role in the peace process, they represent the blind spot of research. Refugees of war are treated as part of the ever increasingnumber of those seeking sanctuary whose rights are protected by the GenevaRefugeeConvention. Whether countries have as pecial responsibility due to their involvement in the war or their contribution to causing flight is, however,s eldom discussed.
In this article, Isuggested admitting refugees of war into the doctrine of the jus post bellum. This position is supported by the fact thatf light is so clearly linked to the damaged one by war.T his is more so than in otherc ases where damagei sd one to persons, such as climate changeo ru njustness as ar esult of the global economic system. Wars are prepared. They requirelong-term financial and logistical planning, especiallyinthe caseofintergovernmentalwars. In the so-called new wars, whereb eginning,course and end have very vaguec ontours,i dentifiable actors are involved as well. In case there is ac lear and undeniable responsibility for displacement,t hese actors,j ust like in civil lawo ra dministrative law, should be obligated to grant refugees sanctuary and/or pay an additional amountofm oney into an international fund for refugees. The liability for compensation, however,d oes not mitigate the moral responsibilityo f other countries to grant refugees of war asylum.
Iquestion the close linkage between the three parts of the theory of the just war: Not onlyunjust aggressors need to be held accountable for damages caused in awar.However,Ido not agree with those who would like to see the ethics of peace building as an independent field. Is hare the wide spread intuition that causing harm, aside from the moral obligation, imposes as pecial responsibility upon actors which they otherwise would not have.
Finally, Iw ould like to brieflyf ocus on an argument that refers to the concept of prevention. It claims thatr esponsibilities that are tied to consequences of war could discourageh umanitarian interventions. Even if that turned out to be correct,i ti si nm yo pinion not decisive.Ahumanitarian intervention aims at providing help for persons in dire need.Itistherefore part of the humanitarian logic to make sure that the endangered persons are protected in as ustainable manner.The willingness to grant them sanctuary and asylum can be understood as al itmus test for the motivation underlying the intervention.S hould the responsibilityofthe parties involved in the war as well as of the international community to reestablish ajustpeace make armed conflicts more difficult,the better.
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